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I. INTRODUCTION
VERY morning at school, public schoolrooms in the United
States generally look alike-the children stand behind their desks
with their right hands over their hearts while reciting the Pledge
*J.D. Candidate 2012, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law; B.A.
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of Allegiance to the U.S. flag. Next, the children often recite the pledge
of allegiance to their respective state flags. The majority of these children
grow up committing these pledges to memory and not thinking twice
about these first ten minutes every morning at school. Similarly, these
children's parents do not concern themselves with these pledges that their
children make at school every morning. Generally, neither the children
nor the parents are aware that the Pledge is required by law.
The current Pledge reads: "'I .pledge allegiance to the Flag of the
United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one
Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."'" The
pledge did not always include "under God."'2 Despite various allegations
against required recitation of these words, the Supreme Court has never
directly addressed the constitutionality of the additional words.3 The
Texas legislature recently modified the pledge of allegiance to the Texas
flag to similarly include "under God," which motivated parents of Texas
public school children to challenge the constitutionality of the modified
pledge.4 The Fifth Circuit then upheld the constitutionality of the modi-
fied pledge.5
This decision is important because the Supreme Court has a chance to
step in and finally clear the murky legislative and judicial history behind
the Pledge of Allegiance and the Establishment Clause. Texas is not the
only state that references God in some form in the state pledge of alle-
giance.6 Some states have their own state pledges and others have
salutes.7 For example, Louisiana also has "under God" in its state
pledge.8 Mississippi similarly includes "Almighty God" in its state
pledge. 9 Other states do not directly have the word "God" in the pledge,
but do have words that entertain or infer a reference to a god. For exam-
ple, Kentucky's pledge ends with "grace from on High." 10 Other states,
such as Alabama, do not make any reference to God."
As seen in Figure 1, one U.S. territory and seven states, including
1. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006) (emphasis added).
2. See discussion infra Part II.
3. See discussion infra Part II.
4. Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 161 (5th Cir. 2010); see also discussion infra Part III.
5. See Croft, 624 F.3d at 170.
6. See, e.g., Kentucky: Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the Commonwealth, NET-
STATE.COM, http://www.netstate.comlstates/symb/pledges/ky-pledge.htm (last visited Aug.
24, 2011) [hereinafter NETSTATE.COM Kentucky] (noting that Kentucky references "grace
from on High").
7. Mark Strasser, Establishing the Pledge: On Coercion, Endorsement, and the Marsh
Wild Card, 40 IND. L. REv. 529, 531 (2007).
8. Louisiana Symbols, State Flag, SHG RESOURCES, http://www.shgresources.com/la/
symbols/flag/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).
9. MIss. CODE ANN. § 37-13-7 (West 1972); Mississippi State Flag, E-RE'ER.
ENcEDESK, http://www.e-referencedesk.com/resources/state-flag/mississippi.html (last vis-
ited Aug. 24, 2011).
10. NETSTATE.COM, Kentucky; supra note 6.
11. See Alabama State Flag, E-REFERENCEDESK, http://www.e-referencedesk.com/re-
sources/state-flaglalabama.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).
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Texas, currently reference God in their state pledges or salutes. 12 No
other cases to date have challenged the validity of these state pledges;
therefore, the Supreme Court should address the issue in Croft v. Perry to
set a precedent for the other states. Not only would this decision set an
example for the other states regarding their state pledges, but it would
also clear the murky waters of the Pledge of Allegiance and the Estab-
lishment Clause.
FIGURE 1: STATE PLEDGES ALLUDING TO OR
REFERENCING GOD 1
3
Stateirerritory Pledge of Allegiance
Guam From the highest of my thoughts, from the deepest of my heart, and with the
utmost of my strength, I offer myself to protect and to defend, the beliefs, the
culture, the language, the air, the water, and our lands, which is our inherent
god-given rights. This I will affirm by the Holy Bible and our banner the
Guam Flag.
Kentucky I pledge allegiance to the Kentucky flag, and to the Sovereign State for
which it stands, one Commonwealth, blessed with diversity, natural wealth,
beauty, and grace from on High.
Louisiana I pledge allegiance to the flag of the state of Louisiana and to the motto for
which it stands: A state, under God, united in purpose and ideals, confident
that justice shall prevail for all of those abiding here.
Mississippi I salute the flag of Mississippi and the sovereign state for which it stands
with pride in her history and achievements and with confidence in her
future under the guidance of Almighty God.
North Carolina I salute the flag of North Carolina and pledge to the Old North State love,
loyalty, and faith.
South Carolina I salute the flag of South Carolina and pledge to the Palmetto State love,
loyalty and faith.
Tennessee Three white stars on a field of blue
God keep them strong and ever true
It is with pride and love that we
Salute the Flag of Tennessee.
Texas Honor the Texas flag; I pledge allegiance to thee, Texas, one state under
God, one and indivisible.
This Comment will discuss the constitutionality of the words "under
God" in the pledges of allegiance to the United States and Texas flags.
Part I provides a general introduction to the Pledge of Allegiance. Next,
Part II discusses the historical background of the Pledge of Allegiance to
the U.S. flag, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and Su-
preme Court dicta regarding the constitutionality of the Pledge. Part III
discusses the pledge of allegiance to the Texas flag and the recent Croft v.
Perry decision. Finally, Part IV analyzes the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Croft v. Perry, argues why the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to
12. See id.
13. American & State Pledges, IDEASITENET, http://www.ideasite.net/pledge/ (last
visited Aug. 24, 2011).
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hear the case, and predicts why the Supreme Court will likely view the
words "under God" in the Texas pledge as unconstitutional.
II. THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. HISTORY OF THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE U.S. FLAG
Francis Bellamy, children's author and Baptist minister, wrote the orig-
inal Pledge of Allegiance 14 in 1892.15 The Pledge was not controversial at
that time because there was a strong sense of Americanism prevailing in
the public; the Pledge reflected this pride by saluting the American flag. 16
In the first half of the twentieth century, many states had flag laws and
encouraged students to pledge their allegiance to the flag.17 Today, al-
most all fifty states require public schools to administer recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance. 18 Forty-three states have statutes authorizing pub-
lic schools to require the recitation of the Pledge. 19
Although the nation has generally shown widespread acceptance to the
Pledge of Allegiance, citizens have protested as early as 1916 against the
requirement of reciting the Pledge.20 The Jehovah's Witnesses were
among the first groups to contest the required recitation of the Pledge.21
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court upheld
the Jehovah's Witnesses' argument that a choice between reciting the
Pledge or expulsion from school violated their freedom of religion rights
under the First Amendment.22 Barnette is distinguishable from the issue
in this Comment because it was decided before the words "under God"
were added to the national pledge.
When Bellamy first wrote the Pledge, he did not include the words
"under God."'23 The codified pledge of 1942 also did not include "under
God. '24 Congress did not add the words "under God" to the Pledge of
14. Carol McKay, The Pledge of Allegiance's Long History of Controversy, 49 FED. L.
9, 13 (2002) (stating the original pledge of allegiance: "I pledge allegiance to my flag and to
the Republic for which it stands-one nation indivisible-with liberty and justice for all.").
15. VINCENT BLASI & SEANA V. SHIFFRIN, THE STORY OF WEST VIRGINIA STATE
BOARD OF EDUCATION V. BARNETTE: THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE AND THE FREEDOM
OF THOUGHT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 433, 434 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
16. Id. at 434-35 (Especially in light of World War I, many state laws and organiza-
tions were dedicated to honoring the U.S. flag.).
17. Id. at 435.
18. David A. Toy, The Pledge: The Constitutionality of an American Icon, 34 J.L. &
EDUc. 25, 33 n.34 (2005).
19. Id.
20. CECILIA ELIZABETH O'LEARY, To DIE FOR: THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN PATRI-
oTIsM 231 (1999) (explaining that an eleven-year-old African-American citizen protested
against the pledge because he associated the flag with discrimination and lynching).
21. BLASI & SHIFFRIN, supra note 15, at 437.
22. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 671 (1943).
23. McKay, supra note 14, at 13.
24. Id. at 12 (noting, however, that the codified pledge in 1942 was not a mirror image
of Bellamy's original text; certain phrases had been altered such as "my flag" to "the flag
of the United States of America").
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Allegiance until 1954.25 The Knights of Columbus pushed for the amend-
ment in 1952 because they wanted to "[encompass] the fabric of
America" by mentioning God.26 Though three circuit courts have at-
tempted to determine the Pledge's constitutionality, 27 the Supreme Court
has never directly determined the constitutionality of these words. Nota-
bly, in 2010, the Court was confronted with the constitutionality of these
words, but the case was resolved on a standing issue.28
B. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
1. The Establishment Clause Generally
Claimants against the Pledge of Allegiance often argue that the re-
quired recitation of the Pledge violates their right to freedom of religion
under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The Establishment
Clause reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ' 29 The Fourteenth
Amendment makes the Establishment Clause "applicable with full force
to the States and their school districts. '30
The Establishment Clause separates church and state; however, the
framers did not necessarily intend complete separation. 31 The Court has
recognized that the Establishment Clause language is "at best opaque,
particularly when compared with other portions of the Amendment. '32
Courts must recognize that the distinction between a proper and im-
proper relationship is not a "wall," but rather a "blurred, indistinct, and
variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular rela-
tionship. '33 The Establishment Clause does not seek to prevent a com-
plete separation of church and state-rather, "it affirmatively mandates
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostil-
ity toward any [religions]. '34
25. JIM WALSH ET AL., THE EDUCATOR'S GUIDE TO TEXAS SCHOOL LAW 270 (7th ed.
2010).
26. Brian Wheeler, The Pledge of Allegiance in the Classroom and the Court: An Epic
Struggle over the Meaning of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 2008 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 281, 285 (2008).
27. See Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010);
Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 407-08 (4th Cir. 2005); Sherman v. Cnty.
Consol. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1992).
28. See Newdow, 597 F.3d at 1016.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 485 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992)); rev'd sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542
U.S. 1 (2004); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31. See, e.g., Paul Andonian, Note, One Nation, Without God?-A Note on the Ninth
Circuit's Decision in Newdow v. United States Congress Holding that Reciting the Pledge of
Allegiance in Public Schools Violates the Establishment Clause and Therefore Unconstitu-
tional, 33 Sw. U. L. REv. 119, 120 (2003).
32. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
33. Id. at 614.
34. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 668 (1984) (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 314 (1952) (emphasis added)).
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Because the Legislature and the Supreme Court have not defined a
strict line between lawful and unlawful acts under the Establishment
Clause, courts have used various methods to determine whether a claim-
ant's rights under the Establishment Clause have been violated. The
courts have skirted defining a strict line or test by merely creating new
tests to achieve their desired results. 35 Consequently, the various
tests contribute to the "[m]urky [w]aters of Establishment Clause
blurisprudence. '' 36 Courts are not restricted to one or all of the tests;
courts have used one, multiple, or all of the tests in addressing an issue.37
These tests include the no-sect-preference test, the Lemon test, the en-
dorsement test, and the coercion test.38
2. The No-Sect-Preference Test
Larson v. Valente established a no-sect-preference test to determine
the validity of government action against the Establishment Clause.39
The Court concluded that "[t]he clearest command of the Establishment
Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred
over another. ' 40 County of Allegheny v. ACLU is a good example of
when a government action violates the Establishment Clause under the
no-sect-preference test.41 There, the Court held that the government vio-
lated the Establishment Clause when it "demonstrate [d] the govern-
ment's allegiance to a particular sect or creed."' 42 Courts have previously
reasoned that a reference to "God" in general does not violate this no-
sect-preference test because it simply acknowledges religion rather than
showing preference for one religion over another.43 Part III will demon-
strate why this reasoning is flawed.
3. The Lemon Test
The Supreme Court established the Lemon test in Lemon v. Kurtzman
to distinguish which acts are permissible under the Establishment
Clause.44 Lemon involved two statutes: a Pennsylvania statute that pro-
vided monetary support to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools
by reimbursing certain costs in secular subjects, and a Rhode Island stat-
ute that authorized the State to pay an extra supplement to teachers in
private elementary schools. 45 The taxpayers alleged under both statutes
35. See discussion infra Part II.B.2-5.
36. Toy, supra note 18, at 40.
37. See e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 669.
38. See discussion infra Part II.B.2-5.
39. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
40. Id.
41. See Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 166 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Cnty. of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603-05 (1989)).
42. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603.
43. See, e.g., id.; see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 42
(2004); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994).
44. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
45. Id. at 606-07, 609.
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that the state financially aided "church-related educational institutions,"
and that the acts violated their First Amendment rights. 46 The Court held
that both statutes were unconstitutional.47 The Court recognized that
"[it] must draw lines with reference to the three main evils against which
the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection: 'sponsor-
ship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in relig-
ious activity." 48 The first prong requires the statute to have a secular
legislative purpose.49 Second, the statute's principal or primary effect
cannot advance or inhibit religion. 50 Finally, the statute cannot foster ex-
cessive government entanglement with religion. 51 Though the Lemon
test has received criticism, 52 it is still applicable law.53 The Court recog-
nized that the test would not prevent total separation because "[s]ome
relationship between government and religious organizations is inevita-
ble."'54 Regardless, the goal behind the Lemon test is "to prevent, as far
as possible, the intrusion of either [the state or religious institutions] into
the precincts of the other. '55
4. The Endorsement Test
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly recog-
nized that the Establishment Clause does not allow for official preference
for religion over nonreligion.56 Justice O'Connor introduced the test by
stating that the test "prohibits government from making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political commu-
nity."' 57 She set forth the two main parts of the test by explaining that
"government can run afoul of that prohibition in two principal ways. One
is excessive entanglement with religious institutions .... The second and
more direct infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of
46. Id. at 624.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243
(1968).
51. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613, 615 (The third prong of the Lemon test has three subsec-
tions: (a) the character and purposes of the institutions that receive the benefit; (b) the
nature of the support that the state provided; and (c) the relationship between the govern-
ment and the religious authority that received the benefit. These subsections will not be
addressed in this Comment because it does not deal with aid, which is the issue to which
these subsections are applied.); see also Walz, 397 U.S. at 668.
52. WALSH ET AL., supra note 25, at 264.
53. The Supreme Court modified the Lemon test in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
204 (1997), by adding three subsections to the second prong of the test. Most courts still
use the original version of the Lemon test and this Comment will use the original version.
Note that the Supreme Court did not use the Lemon test in one case-Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983). Marsh upheld legislative prayer, an issue that is not relevant to
the constitutionality of the pledge of allegiance in public schools.
54. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (citing Zorach v. Clausan, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952)).
55. Id.
56. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 605 (1989); see also Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).




The test maintains that the government cannot endorse or disapprove
of a religion.59 The Court in County of Allegheny adopted the endorse-
ment test in 1989.60 The endorsement test's analysis essentially resembles
the second prong of the Lemon test.61 Often, when a court analyzes an
Establishment Clause issue, it will work through both the Lemon and en-
dorsement tests.62 The endorsement test analysis is often not as in-depth
as the Lemon test analysis because once the second prong of the Lemon
test is established, the court may use the same reasoning to satisfy the
endorsement test.63
Lynch involved a claim challenging a nativity scene in a Rhode Island
city's Christmas display.64 The Court held that the nativity scene in the
Christmas display was not a violation of the Establishment Clause.65 The
nativity scene was part of a Christmas display that also included secular
symbols, such as Santa Clause, a Christmas tree, and a sign that read
"Seasons Greetings. '66 The Court reasoned that because the nativity
scene, though religious, was displayed alongside secular symbols, the gov-
ernment was not simply endorsing religion and thus did not violate the
Establishment Clause.67 Specifically, the Court reasoned that because
the nativity scene was displayed alongside the secular symbols, the bene-
fit to the religion at issue was "indirect, remote, and incidental, and is no
more an advancement or endorsement of religion than the congressional
and executive recognition of the origins of Christmas, or the exhibition of
religious paintings in governmentally supported museums. '68
County of Allegheny also involved a claim against the constitutionality
of a nativity scene in a government holiday display.69 The difference be-
tween Lynch and County of Allegheny is that the County of Allegheny
holiday display did not include secular holiday symbols as in the Lynch
display. 70 Consequently, the Court in County of Allegheny struck down
the constitutionality of the nativity scene in the display. 71 Notably, the
same Court upheld another holiday display that depicted symbols from
various religions-such as a menorah-alongside secular symbols-such
58. Id. at 687-88.
59. Id.
60. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620-21.
61. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
(1971).
62. See, e.g., Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 485 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom.
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004); see also Croft v. Perry, 624
F.3d 157, 166-69 (5th Cir. 2010).
63. See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-621.
64. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 698.
65. See id. at 687.
66. Id. at 668.
67. See id. at 669.
68. Id.
69. Cnty, of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 580 (1989).
70. Compare id., with Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
71. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602.
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as a Christmas tree.72
5. The Coercion Test
Another Establishment Clause test is the coercion test. Lee v. Weis-
man established that under the Establishment Clause, the government
"may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exer-
cise. ... -73 This test is what the government should "at a minimum" not
do.7 4 Lee involved a prayer at a public high school graduation cere-
mony. 75 A state clergyman led the prayer. 76 The Court held that the
government action was a violation of the coercion test and thus violated
the Establishment Clause, reasoning that "subtle coercive pressures ex-
ist[ed] .. . [and the student could not] avoid the fact or appearance of
participation. ' 77 Furthermore, the Court established that having to re-
main silent or stand while the religious act was being performed could be
viewed as participation.78 The Court reasoned that a student is not any
less coerced when he merely stands by in silence-"the act of standing or
remaining in silence signifies mere respect, rather than participation. '79
Furthermore, "[w]hat matters is that, given our social conventions, a rea-
sonable dissenter in this milieu could believe that the group exercise sig-
nified her own participation or approval of it."80
6. Sister Circuits and the Constitutionality of the National Pledge
Three circuits have addressed the constitutionality of the Pledge of Al-
legiance, but no circuit has addressed the constitutionality of a state
pledge of allegiance. 8 1 More importantly, the Supreme Court has not yet
ruled on the constitutionality of the national pledge. 82 In Elk Grove Uni-
fied School District v. Newdow, the Supreme Court skirted the issue by
overruling the Ninth Circuit's holding that the Pledge was unconstitu-
tional on standing grounds. 83 Newdow is the closest the Court has come
to ruling on the issue.84 Regarding the aforementioned three circuits,
Croft v. Perry acknowledges that Sherman v. Community Consolidated
School District, Myers v. Loudoun County Public Schools, and most re-
72. See id. at 619.
73. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 586.
76. Id. at 587.




81. Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 164 (5th Cir. 2010).
82. Id. at 593.
83. Id.
84. Compare Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2004), with
Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010), Myers v.
Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 407-08 (4th Cir. 2005), and Sherman v. Cnty.
Consol. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1992) (Note that the 2010 Ninth Circuit case
is different from the Newdow case discussed in detail in Part III.).
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cently Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District are the three circuit
court cases that address the national pledge's constitutionality.8 5
In Sherman v. Community Consolidated School District, the Seventh
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance. 86 Sher-
man involved a father suing his son's public school district, alleging that
the Illinois statute requiring the recitation of the Pledge was a violation of
the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.87 The court resolved the
issue by allowing the public schools in Illinois to recite the Pledge, rea-
soning that the students did not have to participate. 88 The court looked
at the Illinois statute and determined that because the statute did not say
"all" pupils, and because the statute did not provide for a penalty for
refusing to recite the Pledge, the statute was constitutional. 89
Thirteen years later, in Myers v. Loudoun County Public Schools, a
parent of public school children made a similar claim against a Virginia
public school's school board and superintendent. 90 The Fourth Circuit
held that the Pledge of Allegiance was constitutional against the parent's
Establishment Clause claim.91 The court placed particular emphasis on
the nation's history of endorsing documents that reference God.92 Some
examples include the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and
a public day of thanksgiving.93
Finally, in 2010, the Ninth Circuit joined the Fourth and Seventh Cir-
cuits in Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District and held that the
national pledge was constitutional. 94 The parents of children in a Califor-
nia public school district challenged the validity of the California statute
that codified the amended 1954 Pledge of Allegiance.95 The parents were
atheists. 96 The court reasoned that "both the purpose and effect of the
Pledge are that of a predominantly patriotic, not a religious, exercise. '97
To determine whether the Pledge was religious or patriotic, the court de-
clined to read the religious aspect of the Pledge in isolation. 98 Instead,
the court read the Pledge in light of its original purpose: to inspire patri-
otism.99 The court determined that the Pledge did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause under the Lemon, endorsement, and coercion tests.'00
85. Croft, 624 F.3d at 164-65.
86. Sherman, 980 F.2d at 448.
87. Id. at 439-440.
88. See id. at 439.
89. Id. at 440 (Although later in the opinion, the court expressed that the omission of a
penalty from the statute is not germane to the Establishment Clause analysis.).
90. Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 397-98 (4th Cir. 2005).
91. See id. at 397.
92. See id. at 403-05.
93. Id. at 404.
94. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010).
95. Id. at 1047-48.
96. Id. at 1012-13.
97. Id. at 1037.
98. See id. at 1014.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 1037-40.
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III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW: CROFT V. PERRY
A. THE TEXAS LEGISLATURE ADDS "GOD" TO THE TEXAS PLEDGE
OF ALLEGIANCE
In March 1933, the Texas House of Representatives adopted a state
pledge of allegiance.10 1 House Bill 575 § 3 included the first Texas pledge
of allegiance: "Honor the Texas Flag of 1836; I pledge allegiance to thee,
Texas, one and indivisible."'10 2 Almost seventy-five years later in 2007,
Representative Debbie Riddle pushed for House Bill 1034 to establish a
new pledge of allegiance. 103 Her amended bill proposal added the words
"one state under God" to the pledge. 10 4 The Texas legislature amended
the bill, and the current Texas pledge of allegiance reads: "Honor the
Texas flag; I pledge of allegiance to thee, Texas, one state under God, one
and indivisible.' 10 5
The Texas Education Code requires students to recite the pledges of
allegiance every day.106 Specifically, the Texas Education Code requires
each child in each public school district to recite both the Pledge of Alle-
giance to the U.S. flag 10 7 and the pledge of allegiance to the Texas flag.108
Under Texas Education Code § 25.082(c), a student may be excused from
reciting the pledges with a written request from his parent or guardian. 0 9
1. Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow
In 2002, the Ninth Circuit held that the Pledge of Allegiance was un-
constitutional in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow." 0
Michael Newdow originally sued his daughter's school district, claiming
that the Pledge of Allegiance was unconstitutional because it contained
the words "under God" and this was a "religious indoctrination" of his
daughter."' Specifically, he opposed the school district's policy requiring
elementary school classes to recite the Pledge of Allegiance every morn-
ing."l2 He argued that the policy was a violation of his and his daughter's
freedom of religion rights under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment." 3
101. Texas: Pledge of Allegiance to State Flag, NETSTATE.COM, http://www.netstate.com/
states/symb/pledges/tx-pledge.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).
102. Id.
103. Tex. H.B. 1034, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007), available at http://www.netstate.com/states/
symb/pledges/documents/hb01034f.pdf; Texas: Pledge of Allegiance to State Flag, supra
note 101.
104. Id.
105. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 3100.101 (West 2007).
106. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.082 (West 2002).
107. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
108. See EDUC. § 25.082; see also GoV'T § 3100.101.
109. See EDUC. § 25.082.
110. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 7-8.
113. Id. at 24-25.
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The Ninth Circuit ultimately decided that the national pledge was un-
constitutional because it endorsed "not just religion generally, but a mon-
otheistic religion organized 'under God.' ",114 The court reasoned that:
The pledge to a nation "under God," with its imprimatur of govern-
mental sanction, provides the message to Newdow's young daughter
not only that non-believers, or believers in non-Judeo-Christian reli-
gions, are outsiders, but more specifically that her father's beliefs are
those of an outsider, and necessarily inferior to what she is exposed
to in the classroom. Just as the foundational principle of the Freedom
of Speech Clause in the First Amendment tolerates unpopular and
even despised ideas, so does the principle underlying the Establish-
ment Clause protect unpopular and despised minorities from govern-
ment sponsored religious orthodoxy tied to government services. 115
The Court in Newdow v. U.S. Congress recognized the Lemon test, the
endorsement test, and the coercion test." 6 The court ultimately decided
that the Pledge of Allegiance was unconstitutional under the coercion
test, but it did not elaborate on the Lemon or endorsement tests.117 The
court reasoned that "[w]e are free to apply any or all of the three tests,
and to invalidate any measure that fails any one of them. 11 8 Because the
coercion test is the "minimum" of what a government cannot do, and the
court already determined that the national pledge did not even meet this
constitutional minimum, the court decided that it was not necessary to
also discuss the Lemon and endorsement tests.119
The Ninth Circuit determined that the Pledge of Allegiance was uncon-
stitutional under the coercion test.120 Specifically, the court determined
that acknowledging that the United States is one nation "under God" is
not "merely descriptive of the undeniable historical significance of relig-
ion in the founding of the Republic.' 12' The court also emphasized that
the Pledge is especially coercive in the context of schools because of the
"age and impressionability of school children, and their understanding
that they are required to adhere to the norms set by their school, their
teacher[,] and their fellow students."'1 22 The court did not require a show-
ing that the daughter had actually been coerced into reciting the Pledge;
in fact, the court was satisfied that simply being present while her fellow
classmates and teacher recited the Pledge was enough to make the Pledge
a violation of the Establishment Clause.123
114. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 313 F.3d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 2002).
115. Id. at 505.
116. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 487-90 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
117. See id. at 488.




122. Id. at 488.
123. See id.
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To support its conclusion, the court pointed to previous Supreme Court
cases that had struck down the constitutionality of a government's actions
because they did not comport with the Establishment Clause.124 The
court also considered the legislative history of amending the national
pledge to include "under God. ' 125 The court pointed to President Eisen-
hower's statement that the Pledge was for every school child to "[dedi-
cate] ... our Nation and our people to the Almighty."'1 26 Furthermore,
when the classes recite the Pledge, they swear under the values of the
flag, including monotheism since 1954.127 The court went even further
and analogized pledging "under God" as identical to pledging "'under
Jesus,' a nation 'under Vishnu,' a nation 'under Zeus,' or a nation 'under
no god,' because none of these professions can be neutral with respect to
religion.' 28 The court also noted that the Pledge put the public school
students "in the untenable position of choosing between participating in
an exercise with religious content or protesting."'129
The Supreme Court reversed the decision but not based on the Ninth
Circuit's analysis. 130 Rather, the Court held that Newdow did not have
standing to bring suit; therefore, the Court dismissed the case.' 3 '
Newdow had originally brought suit on his own behalf and on behalf of
his daughter as next friend.132 In the Supreme Court decision, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist concurred but recognized that the Court averted the real
issue of the Pledge's constitutionality by characterizing the dismissal as "a
novel prudential standing principle in order to avoid reaching the merits
of the constitutional claim."'1 33 To this day, the Supreme Court has not
readdressed the Ninth Circuit's holding that "schools may [not] coerce
impressionable young schoolchildren to recite [the Pledge], or even to
stand mute while it is being recited by their classmates.' 34
2. Croft v. Perry
In Croft v. Perry, the Fifth Circuit recently decided that the words "one
state under God" in the Texas pledge of allegiance are constitutional and
not a violation of the Establishment Clause. 135 The Crofts, parents of
minor Texas public school children, sued Governor Rick Perry, alleging
that the Texas pledge of allegiance and the Texas Education Code were
124. See id. at 485-86.
125. Id. at 488.
126. Id. at 488 (citing 100 CONG. REC. 8618 (1954) (statement of Sen. Ferguson incorpo-
rating signing statement of President Eisenhower)).
127. Id. at 487.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 488.
130. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 18 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring).
131. See id.
132. Id. at 8.
133. Id. at 18 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
134. Newdow, 328 F.3d at 489.
135. Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2010).
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unconstitutional. 136 They sought injunctive and declaratory relief.' 37 The
district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.' 38
The court tested the pledge and education code against all the applicable
Establishment Clause tests 139 and held that they were constitutional. 40
The Crofts then appealed to the Fifth Circuit. 141 The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the lower court and held that the pledge and the education code
were constitutional and did not violate the Establishment Clause. 142 Be-
cause the court analyzed the complaints as a facial challenge, the Crofts
had the burden to prove that "there [was] no set of circumstances under
which either the language of the pledge or the requirement that children
recite the pledge in classrooms is constitutional.' 14 3 Therefore, the Crofts
had the burden to show that both the pledge and the Texas Education
Code were unconstitutional under every test. 144
The Crofts argued that the Texas pledge of allegiance was a violation of
the Establishment Clause because:
(1) the pledge's use of the singular "God" impermissibly favors
monotheistic over polytheistic beliefs; (2) the amendment does not
have a secular purpose or effect, as any stated purpose is pretext for
a religious motivation; (3) the pledge impermissibly endorses relig-
ious belief by affirming that Texas is organized "under God"; and (4)
the pledge's recitation in schools pursuant to § 25.082 of the Texas
Education Code impermissibly coerces religious belief. 145
The government set forth two rationales behind the addition of "under
God" in the Texas pledge."46 The first argument stemmed from the
pledge's legislative history. 147 Representative Riddle, the representative
who first advocated for the additional words, pushed that the state pledge
needed to be amended to better mirror the national pledge."48 Under her
theory, because the national pledge included the words "under God," the
state pledge should similarly include those words. 149 However, Repre-
sentative Riddle was selective in her choice of what to mirror from the
national pledge of allegiance.' 50 For example, she declined to include the
words "with liberty and justice for all.'' The second argument for the
136. Id. at 161.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 163.
139. See supra Part II.
140. Croft, 624 F.3d at 161 (The court also decided that the Crofts brought facial, rather
than as-applied, challenges to the pledge of allegiance.).
141. Id. at 161-62.
142. See id. at 162.
143. Id. at 164.
144. See supra Part II.
145. Croft, 624 F.3d at 162-63.
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additional words arose from Texas Senator Dan Patrick.152 He proposed
that because several other founding-era documents demonstrated the
Founding Fathers' intention to "acknowledge our Judeo-Christian heri-
tage," the state should also honor this intention by placing "under God"
in the new pledge.153 He was concerned with honoring the heritage of
the United States by using the reference to God to acknowledge the na-
tion's religious heritage. 154
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by laying out the history of the
Pledge of Allegiance. 155 The court agreed with the Crofts that the cir-
cumstances around the national pledge's adoption are not directly appli-
cable to the constitutionality of the Texas pledge; however, the court did
reason that analyzing the national pledge would still be relevant. 156 The
court acknowledged that the Supreme Court never "directly addressed
the constitutionality of the national pledge," but relied instead on Su-
preme Court dicta.157 The Fifth Circuit read the Supreme Court cases to
indicate that the Supreme Court would uphold the Pledge of Allegiance's
constitutionality. 58 The court did acknowledge, however, that it would
not take the dicta as determinative of the Croft case. 15 9 Next, the court
acknowledged that three circuits have upheld the constitutionality of the
national pledge.160 The three circuits upheld the constitutionality of the
national pledge on the basis that it was a patriotic-not a religious-ac-
tivity, and thus did not violate the Establishment Clause.' 6 '
Analyzing the Texas pledge, the court worked its way through the
tests162 to determine whether the pledge violated the Establishment
Clause. 163 The Crofts challenged the Texas pledge's constitutionality
under four tests: the no-sect-preference test, the Lemon test, the endorse-
ment test, and the coercion test.164 First, the no-sect-preference test
stemmed from Larson v. Valente.165 Larson stated that under the Estab-




155. See id. at 164-65 (The court addressed this issue first to address House Represen-
tative Riddle's argument that she wanted to mirror the national pledge.).
156. See id. at 165.
157. Id. at 164; see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2004);
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 675 (1984).
158. See Croft, 624 F.3d at 165; see also Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 7-8, Cnty. of Allegheny,
492 U.S. at 602-03; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 675.
159. See Croft, 624 F.3d at 164.
160. See id. at 164-65 (citing Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007,
1037 (9th Cir. 2010); Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 407-08 (4th Cir.
2005); Sherman v. Cnty. Consol. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1992)).
161. Croft, 624 F.3d at 164-65; see also Newdow, 597 F.3d at 1037; Myers, 418 F.3d at
407-08; Sherman, 980 F.2d at 445.
162. See supra Part II.
163. See Croft, 624 F.3d at 165.
164. Id. at 165-70.
165. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
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ferred over another."'1 66 Particularly, the government cannot show
preference for or allegiance to one sect or religion over another. 167 The
court rejected the Crofts' argument that a reference to "God" shows a
preference for monotheistic religions. 168 The court instead followed Jus-
tice O'Connor's rationale in Elk Grove that a reference to "God" does
not violate this test because it is an acknowledgement of religion in gen-
eral and not a preference for a particular sect.169
Second, the court held that the Texas pledge is constitutional under the
Lemon test, which makes a statute unconstitutional "if (1) it does not
have a secular purpose, (2) its principal or primary effect advances or
inhibits religion, or (3) it creates excessive government entanglement
with religion."'1 70 The court rejected the Crofts' argument under the first
prong that the legislature did not really intend to mirror the national
pledge.' 71 The Crofts argued that the national pledge's legislative history
did not have a secular purpose and there was no secular purpose behind
the Texas legislature adopting the additional words. 172 The Fifth Circuit
sided with the government's rationale of mirroring the national pledge. 73
It decided that "[a]cknowledgement of religious heritage, although relig-
iously oriented, 'is no less secular simply because it is infused with a relig-
ious element.'"174 Furthermore, the court distinguished Croft from other
Supreme Court decisions that involved secular purposes that were
"shams.' 75 The court also dismissed the Crofts' argument that the secu-
lar purpose was a sham because the legislature refused to include the
national pledge's phrase "with liberty and justice for all."' 176
The court similarly rejected the Crofts' argument that the second prong
of the Lemon test was not satisfied.177 The Crofts alleged that the pledge
promoted monotheistic religion to the exclusion of polytheistic or nonre-
ligions. 78 They argued that the pledge effectively forced public school
children who were not monotheistic to endure listening to their teacher
and the rest of the class recite a pledge that disapproved of their religion
or nonreligion.179 The court struck down this argument because it rea-
166. Croft, 624 F.3d at 165-66 (quoting Larson, 456 U.S. at 244).
167. Id. at 166 (citing Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603-05 (1989)).
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
171. See id. at 167.
172. Id. at 166.
173. See id. at 167.
174. Id. (quoting Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337, 345 (5th Cir.
1999)).
175. Id. For example, the court discussed Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985). See
id. The Wallace Court struck down Alabama's attempt to amend the moment of silence
statute to read "meditation or voluntary prayer" because the old statute already satisfied
the purported purpose to add the additional words. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 168.
178. Id. at 168.
179. See id.
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soned that the pledge should be viewed in its entirety.1 80 The court fol-
lowed the rationale from Lynch that "[f]ocus[ing] exclusively on the
religious component of any activity would inevitably lead to its invalida-
tion under the Establishment Clause. ' 181 The court concluded that the
Crofts offered no reason, in viewing the Texas pledge as a whole, to show
that the words "under God" changed the pledge from a patriotic act to an
act that "primarily endorses religious belief in violation of the Establish-
ment Clause. ' 182 Rather, the court reasoned that the pledge still satisfies
the second prong of the Lemon test because "[a] reasonable observer
would conclude that the pledge remains a patriotic exercise, intended to
inculcate fidelity to the state and respect for its history and values, one of
which is its religious heritage. '183
Next, the court held that the pledge is valid in light of the endorsement
test.184 Under the endorsement test, the government violates the Estab-
lishment Clause when "it endorses a particular religious belief, because
'[e]ndorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community.'185 The Crofts argued that
a polytheistic public school child should not have to listen to the rest of
his class endorse a belief or pledge that is blatantly against his beliefs. 186
They argued that the pledge would make the child feel less a member of
that community, which is against the endorsement test rationale.187 Be-
cause the endorsement test is similar to the second prong of the Lemon
test, the court used the same reasoning to conclude that the addition of
"under God' ''acknowledges but does not endorse religious belief;"
therefore, the pledge does not violate the endorsement test.188
Finally, the Fifth Circuit held that the Texas Education Code mandat-
ing the recitation of the pledge does not violate the coercion test.189
Under the coercion test, the "government may not coerce anyone to sup-
port or participate in religion or its exercise." 190 Furthermore, the coer-
cion test is split into three parts: "(1) the government directs (2) a formal
religious exercise (3) in such a way as to oblige the participation of objec-
tors."19' The Crofts argued that the teacher-led pledge coerces students
to participate.1 92 Analyzing the validity of the pledge under the coercion
180. See id. (The court compared this analysis to two other cases in which a state flag
and city insignia were viewed as a whole rather than looking at a cross on either
individually.).
181. Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984)).
182. Id.
183. Id. (Note that the Crofts only argued that the pledge violated the first two prongs
of the Lemon test, so this Comment will not discuss the third prong in detail.).





189. See id. at 170.
190. Id. at 169 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)).





test, the court reasoned that "religious components are placed in context
and the ultimate question is whether 'the religious component of any gov-
ernment practice or policy . . . overwhelm[s] the nonreligious
portions.' "193
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to Croft v. Perry and the
Court should reverse the Fifth Circuit's decision. The Establishment
Clause does not allow official endorsement of any type of religion, even if
it is not specified.194 Many cases have challenged the constitutionality of
the words "under God" in the United States, and now the Texas pledge of
allegiance has been challenged. 195 The Supreme Court will most likely
see in Croft the opportunity to clarify once and for all what Elk Grove
already addressed in 2003-that the words "under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance violate the Establishment Clause.
Applying the different Establishment Clause tests in Part III, the Su-
preme Court should reverse Croft v. Perry because the words "under
God" in the Texas pledge of allegiance violate the Crofts' rights under the
no-sect-preference, Lemon, endorsement, and coercion tests. Courts are
often less inclined to limit themselves to one single Establishment Clause
test; rather, courts have walked through the several tests to determine
whether there has been a violation of the Establishment Clause. 196
Therefore, this Comment will reanalyze the Texas pledge of allegiance
under each test mentioned in Croft. In doing so, this Comment will
demonstrate why the government's arguments in Croft were flawed.
A. APPLYING THE No-SECT-PREFERENCE TEST
The Texas pledge of allegiance fails under the no-sect-preference test.
Larson v. Valente established the no-sect-preference test. 97 The test is a
"basic threshold criterion" for determining the constitutionality of a gov-
ernment action under the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment.198  Larson stated that "[t]he clearest command of the
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be offi-
cially preferred over another."' 99 The Fifth Circuit was incorrect in using
Justice O'Connor's statement to conclude that "under God" was just an
acknowledgement of religion in general. 200 The Crofts are correct in ar-
193. Id. (quoting Doe ex rel. Doe, 173 F.3d at 291).
194. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
195. See Croft, 624 F.3d at 161; Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007,
1037 (9th Cir. 2010); Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 407-08 (4th Cir.
2005); Sherman v. Cnty. Consol. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1992).
196. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 669 (1984).
197. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
198. Croft, 624 F.3d at 165; Larson, 456 U.S. at 244.
199. Larson, 456 U.S. at 244.
200. See Croft, 624 F.3d at 166; Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 42
(2004).
[Vol. 641480
The Pledge of Allegiance
guing that the Texas pledge does not pass the no-sect-preference test be-
cause it shows governmental preference for monotheistic religions over
other religions and nonreligions. 20 1 The government did in fact engage in
"legislative favoritism" by amending the Texas pledge to include "under
God" because it shows a preference for people who believe in one God
over people like atheists, agnostics, and polytheists.20 2 For example,
atheists are individuals who "critique and den[y] ... metaphysical beliefs
in God or spiritual beings. ' 20 3 They do not believe in any gods, which
excludes them from the phrase "under God." Agnostics repudiate tradi-
tional Judeo-Christian theism, but agnostics are not atheists.204 Further-
more, agnostics differ from monotheists, atheists, and polytheists in that
they often have not decided whether they believe in a god.205 Therefore,
because there are populations of atheists, agnostics, and polytheists in the
United States, the government has violated the no-sect-preference test by
adding "under God" to the Texas pledge.
B. APPLYING THE LEMON TEST
The Texas pledge also fails under the Lemon test. Under the first
prong of the Lemon test,20 6 the government's purpose behind amending
the pledge must be secular.207 The court stated that if the purpose had
actually been a "sham," then the amendment would not pass the first
prong of the Lemon test.20 8 The government has two alleged purposes
behind amending the Texas pledge. 20 9 The government argued that when
the Texas legislature amended the Texas pledge of allegiance to include
the words "under God," Representative Riddle and Senator Dan Patrick
urged that the purpose and rationale behind the amendment was to mir-
ror the national pledge and to honor the Founding Fathers' apparent in-
tention to acknowledge the nation's Judeo-Christian heritage.210 The
government's argument is flawed.
First, Representative Riddle argued that she wanted to "mirror" the
national pledge. This purpose may on its face appear secular; however,
when we take her alleged purpose and compare it to the actual amend-
ment, it appears that the purpose was in fact religious and not secular at
all. The Fifth Circuit states that we should view the pledge in its en-
201. See Croft, 624 F.3d at 165.
202. See Croft, 624 F.3d at 165-66.
203. Kai E. Nielsen, Atheism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/40634/atheism (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).
204. Kai E. Nielsen, Agnosticism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.
com/EBchecked/topic/9356/agnosticism (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).
205. Id.
206. See supra Part II.
207. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); Croft, 624 F.3d at 166.
208. See Croft, 624 F.3d at 166; see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
209. Croft, 624 F.3d at 162.




tirety.21' At least when the court is determining whether the amendment
had a secular purpose, the court should look at the additional words in
light of the alleged legislative purpose and compare whether they are in
line with each other. It is odd that Representative Riddle refused to also
add "with liberty and justice for all" and only elected to add the selective
words "under God. '2 12 The amendment effectively transformed the
Texas pledge, which was originally secular in nature, to a religious action.
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit also acknowledged that it looked to the
three circuits that have already directly addressed the constitutionality of
the national pledge.2 13 One should not use an analysis of the constitu-
tionality of the national pledge to determine the validity of a state pledge.
The history surrounding the enactment of the national pledge was over a
hundred years before the enactment of the Texas pledge. The circum-
stances surrounding these pledges are not comparable, and thus the
pledges should be analyzed separately.
Secondly, Senator Patrick's alleged purpose of honoring our Founding
Fathers' intentions is flawed. He purports that the amended Texas pledge
aims to honor the Founding Fathers' acknowledgment of our Judeo-
Christian heritage; however, it again seems odd that the words "liberty
and justice for all," cornerstone ideals of the nation, would not be
honored as the Founding Fathers' intention as well.2 14 Even the 2010
Newdow court recognized that the nation's fundamental ideals include
the nation's indivisibility, the people's "liberty," and a system that pro-
vides "justice for all."'21 5 Therefore, if the legislature really wanted to
mirror the national pledge and honor the ideals of our Founding Fathers,
it appears that it excluded at least three very important ideals while selec-
tively choosing to incorporate only the religious aspect of the national
pledge.
Furthermore, it is erroneous to compare the enactment of the national
pledge to the Texas pledge because the circumstances are very different.
For example, the national pledge was written in celebration of Columbus
discovering America.21 6 Some of the purposes behind amending the na-
tional pledge to include "under God" were "distinguishing the United
States from the atheistic Soviet Union, affirming that this is a religious
country, and teaching children that the nation is under God. '2 17 Argua-
211. See Croft, 624 F.3d at 168 (comparing this analysis to two cases in which a state flag
and city insignia were viewed as a whole rather than looking at a cross on either
individually).
212. Tex. H.B. 1034; see also Croft, 624 F.3d at 162.
213. See Croft, 624 F.3d at 164-65 (citing Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597
F.3d 1007, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010); Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 407-08
(4th Cir. 2005); Sherman v. Cnty. Consol. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1992)).
214. Id. at 162.
215. 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006); Newdow, 597 F.3d at 1012.
216. Strasser, supra note 7.
217. Id. at 531 n.12-13 (2007) (citing Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S.
1, 25-26 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("The amendment's sponsor, Representative
Rabaut, said its purpose was to contrast this country's belief in God with the Soviet
Union's embrace of atheism.") and Andonian, supra note 31 ("[M]any argued that [the
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bly, these are not the circumstances that the Texas legislature faced when
it amended the Texas pledge in 2007. In fact, as shown in Figure 2 below,
statistical data from the United States Census Bureau demonstrates that
there are over thirty self-identified religions and nonreligions in the
United States.218
FIGURE 2: SELF-DESCRIBED RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION
OF ADULT POPULATION: 1990 TO 2008219
Religious group 1990 2001 2008 Religous group 1990 2001 2008
Adult population, total I .... 175,440 207,983 228.182 Church of the Brethren ......... 206 358 231
Total Christian .............. 151,225 159,514 173,402 NondenornfoationaJl. .. ........ 194 2,489 8.032
Catholic ..................... 46,004 50,873 57,199 Disciples of Christ ............. 144 492 263
Baptist...................... 33,964 33,820 36.148 ReformedDutch Reform ........ 161 289 206
Protestant-no denonation ApostoliciNew Apostolic ........ 117 254 970
supplied .................. 17,214 4.647 5.187 Quaker...................... 67 217 130
Methodlst/WeslaYn ........... 14,174 14,039 11,366 Christian Reform .............. 40 79 381
Lutheran .................... 9,110 9,580 8,674 Foursquare Gospel ............ 28 70 116
Christian-no denomination
supplied .................... 8,073 14,190 16,834 Total other religions I .......... 5,853 7,740 8,796
Presbyterian ................. 4,985 5,596 4.723 Jewish ...................... 3,137 2,837 2.680
Pentseostal/3harsnalc.......... 3,116 4,407 5,416 Muslim ...................... 527 1,104 1,349
Episcopaltan/Angtican ........... 3,043 3,451 2,405 Buddhist.................... 404 1,082 1,189
Mormon/Latter-Day Saints ....... 2,487 2,697 3,158 Unitarianrtiniversallst .......... 502 629 586
Churches of Christ ............. 1,769 2,593 1.921 Hindu ........................ 227 766 582
Jehovah's Withess ............. 1,381 1,331 1,914 Native American ............... 47 103 186
Seventh-Day Adventist ......... 668 724 938 Wicaan .... 8............... a 134 342
Assemblies of God ............ 617 1,105 810 Pagan ..................... (NA) 140 340
Holrnessil-oly ................. 610 569 352 Spiritualist .................. (NA) 116 426
Congregatloa!/Unted Church of Other unlassiled ............. 837 386 735
Christ.................... 438 1,378 736
Church of the Nazarene ........ 549 544 358 No religion specified, total 2 ..... 14,331 29,481 34.169
Church o God............... 590 943 663 Atheist ................... () 902 1,621
Orthodox (Eastern) ............ 502 645 824 Agnostic..................... .1,186 991 1,985
EvangeficaYBorn Again ' ........ 546 1,088 2.154 No religion .................. 13,116 27,486 30.427
Mennonite. .................. 235 346 438
Christian Science .............. 1.214 194 339 Refused to reply to question .... 4,031 11.246 11,815
The statistics show that, although Christianity is the predominant relig-
ion in the United States, there is a diverse variety of religions and nonre-
ligions, including atheists, in the United States. The Establishment
Clause provides freedom of religion to all citizens of the United States,
not just the majority religion. Lemon recognized that "what would ap-
pear to some to be essential to good citizenship might well for others
border on or constitute instruction in religion. '220 While pledging one's
allegiance to God may be "essential" to a good portion of the United
States, the statistics show that it may also intrude on other individuals'
freedom of religion rights under the Establishment Clause.221 There is a
group of individuals in the United States that specifically stands against
what Senator Patrick wants to honor. As previously discussed, agnostics
amendment to the Pledge] was specifically tailored to encourage children to recite the
phrase in classrooms in order to advance a belief in God, as an attempt to distinguish the
United States from the atheist beliefs of communist countries.")).
218. See infra Figure 2 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SELF-DESCRIBED RELIGIOUS
IDENTIFICATIONS OF ADULT POPULATION: 1992 TO 2008 (2011), available at http://
www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/lls0075.pdf).
219. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SELF-DESCRIBED RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATIONS OF ADULT
POPULATION: 1992 TO 2008 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/
2011/tables/11s0075.pdf.
220. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
221. See id. at 619.
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"repudiate[] traditional Judeo-Christian [theism]. '222 In light of the
above, the Texas statute codifying the amended Texas pledge does not
satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test because it was not amended for a
secular purpose.
Secondly, the Texas pledge does not satisfy the second prong of the
Lemon test. The second prong does not allow a statute to have a "princi-
pal or primary effect [that] advances or inhibits religion. '2 23 The court
looked at the pledge in its entirety and erroneously concluded that rea-
sonable individuals could not "fairly understand [its] purpose" to endorse
religion.224 A reasonable individual could have arguably considered the
previous Texas pledge a mere patriotic act; however, because of the anal-
ysis established for the first prong, the pledge could easily be seen as a
religious act. Looking at the entire text as the court argues we should,
the words "I pledge allegiance" to a "nation under God" could be seen as
a religious act by many individuals in the United States who believe in no
god or several gods. Furthermore, the court attempts to use dicta from
Lynch to establish that just because a state legislature infers an "inciden-
tal benefit upon religion," that action does not violate the Establishment
Clause.225 On the contrary, the benefit upon religion in this case is not
"incidental" at all. In fact, in light of the analysis set forth under the first
prong of the Lemon test, it appears that the Texas legislature intention-
ally conferred this benefit upon those individuals who believe in a God
over individuals who do not. In light of the above, the Texas pledge also
does not satisfy the second prong of the Lemon test.
Finally, the Texas pledge does not satisfy the third prong of the Lemon
test. Croft does not even go into the third-prong analysis. 226 The third
prong of the Lemon test does not allow a statute to "[create] excessive
government entanglement with religion.122 7 Because the pledge already
does not satisfy the first two prongs of the test, the pledge also fails the
third prong because the Texas legislature decided to amend the pledge
and to compel recitation of the new words "under God." Therefore, the
amended Texas pledge fails all three prongs of the Lemon test and vio-
lates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
C. APPLYING THE ENDORSEMENT TEST
Allegheny adopted the endorsement test and held that endorsing more
than one religion (for example, Judaism and Christianity) is "no less con-
222. Agnosticism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/concise/ag-
nosticism (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
223. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612; Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 167-68 (5th Cir. 2010).
224. Croft, 624 F.3d at 168 (citing Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594
(1989)).
225. Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984)).
226. See id.
227. Id. at 166; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jane Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 293 (2000); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 602-03 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-56 (1985);
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
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stitutionally infirm than endorsement of Christianity alone. '228 Follow-
ing this analysis, the majority's reasoning in Croft is flawed because the
phrase "under God," although it does not endorse a specific religion, still
endorses a religion that recognizes one or several gods. Under Allegheny,
the Court recognized that any endorsement of any religion is still a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause. 229 Individuals such as atheists, who be-
lieve in no god, would be excluded from this group of individuals.
Furthermore, the Court in Allegheny recognized that the government
could not argue history as a reason for acts that show the government's
preference to a particular religion.230
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch first established the endorse-
ment test.231 Even that Court recognized that although "[o]ur history is
pervaded by official acknowledgement of the role of religion in American
life.., equally pervasive is evidence of accommodation of all faiths and
all forms of religious expression and hostility toward none. 232 Following
this rationale, Representative Riddle and Senator Patrick's purpose be-
hind amending the Texas pledge is flawed because, although our Found-
ing Fathers may have recognized our "Judeo-Christian" heritage, the
reality is that in the past century a variety of religions and nonreligions
have migrated or formed in the United States. Justice O'Connor's con-
currence confirmed that the Court would not tolerate any government
endorsement of any religion.233 She reasoned that any endorsement of
any religion would "send[ ] a message to nonadherents that they are out-
siders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the...
community. '234 Considering the nation's diverse population, "under
God" does not satisfy the endorsement test.
Some scholars have argued that the national pledge passes the endorse-
ment test because "[the] phrase ['under God'] merely acknowledges, in a
neutral way, that many Americans have believed and do believe in
God. '235 However, in the same argument, scholars have cited Justice
O'Connor's reasoning behind the endorsement test.236 This argument
seems flawed and contradictory in itself because the scholars are ac-
knowledging that simply "many" and not "all" Americans have believed
or do believe in God. In propounding the endorsement test, Justice
O'Connor did not say that a government action would be valid under the
endorsement test if at least it protected "many" Americans. In fact, her
language shows that she is concerned more with the "outsiders" who will
228. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 615.
229. Id. at 620-21.
230. See id. at 603.
231. Toy, supra note 18, at 46.
232. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 668 (1984) (emphasis added).
233. See id. at 690.
234. Id. at 688.
235. E.g., Toy, supra note 18, at 47-48.
236. Id. at 46-47.
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not feel like they are members of the community.237
Finally, the history of the Pledge of Allegiance claims against the Es-
tablishment Clause is itself indicative that the Texas pledge fails the en-
dorsement test. Going back to Justice O'Connor's main rationale behind
the test, the test was established so that no religion or individual would
feel like an outsider, nor would anyone feel that the government was en-
dorsing one religion or belief over another.238 The fact that there are
individuals even bringing claims against the school districts or govern-
ments shows that the recitation of the Pledge does make individuals feel
like outsiders to the point that they are protesting to the legal system.
Furthermore, it is not just one religion or faith that is protesting against
the Pledge. For example, in Sherman and Newdow, the complaining fa-
thers were atheists. 239 In Myers, the father belonged to the Anabaptist
Mennonite faith, which is a Christian sect that is highly against the inter-
twining of church and state.240 Going further back into the history of the
Pledge, the Jehovah's Witnesses were among the first protestors against
the Pledge of Allegiance.241 This diversity in complainants demonstrates
that the recitation of the Texas pledge of allegiance does offend and ex-
clude those individuals about whom Justice O'Connor was concerned.242
D. APPLYING THE COERCION TEST
Under the coercion test, the Texas pledge violates the Establishment
Clause. The coercion test was established in Lee v. Weisman when the
Court struck down the validity of a clergyman conducting prayer at a
public high school graduation. The Court reasoned that the students
could not help but feel "subtle coercive pressures" to participate or watch
the participation.2 43 Similarly, in a classroom, the students cannot help
but feel coerced into participating or at least witnessing the pledge recita-
tion every morning. While some states do have statutes excusing students
from reciting the pledge,2 44 in reality these statutes do not diminish the
pressure that students feel to go along with what the other students and
teachers are doing.
Courts have recognized that often students will simply go along with
what the majority is doing, simply because that is what they are exposed
to.245 In fact, many students probably do not even know that they have
the right to refrain from participating in the pledge. Lee showed that the
237. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
238. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603-05 (1989); see also Lynch, 465
U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
239. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010); Sher-
man v. Cnty. Consol. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1992).
240. Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 397 (4th Cir. 2005).
241. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 627-28 (1943).
242. See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602-04; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
243. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992).
244. See, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.082(c) (West 2003).
245. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 593.
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Court is not looking for a great amount of pressure on the student; rather,
the Court acknowledged that "subtle coercive pressures" existed and that
was enough for the Court to invalidate the government action.246 In
Croft, these "subtle coercive pressures" also existed. Just as the Court
struck down the recitation of a prayer at the high school graduation in
Lee, the Court should similarly strike down the constitutionality of the
additional words in the Texas pledge. As discussed in the analysis of
prior tests, the additional words make the pledge an endorsement of re-
ligion, which is already in itself a violation of the Establishment
Clause.247 The violation is also in light of the pledge being recited every
morning and the Texas Education Code requiring public school children
to recite the pledge. 248
Furthermore, Barnette held that schools could not directly coerce stu-
dents to recite the national pledge. 249 The Barnette decision was decided
even before Congress added the words "under God" to the national
pledge.250 The Court emphasized that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein. ' '251 Furthermore, Lee sympathized that "[w]hat to most believ-
ers may seem nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbe-
liever respect their religious practices, in a school context may appear to
the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of
the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy." 252 Especially in light of this
decision, the Supreme Court should overturn Croft because students
should be at least as protected, or even more so protected, than the stu-
dents in Barnette because "under God" makes the recitation a more relig-
ious act.253
Finally, holding that the Texas pledge violates the coercion test is not
contradictory to Supreme Court dicta. The Newdow court acknowledged
that this holding would not be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's pre-
vious holding that allowed students to recite the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, which has religious affiliations. 254 The court distinguished the two
cases by looking at the text of the Declaration of Independence versus
the Pledge of Allegiance.255 The distinguishing factor is that the Pledge
requires the student to recite, "I pledge," which, unlike the Declaration,
246. Id. at 588.
247. See supra Part IV.A-C.
248. See EDUC. § 25.082; Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 161-62 (5th Cir. 2010).
249. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943).
250. Id. at 626.
251. Id. at 642.
252. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
253. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641-42.
254. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 489 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
255. See id. (citing J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS (JO. Urmsson &
Marina Sbisa eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1975) (1962)).
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"is not merely a reflection of the author's profession of faith ... [but
rather] an affirmation by the person reciting it. '"256
E. FINAL FLAWS IN THE GOVERNMENT'S JUSTIFICATIONS
The government's historical argument that the words "under God"
were added to the Texas pledge of allegiance as an act of patriotic rever-
ence to the national pledge is flawed. 257 The government claims that it
added the words to recognize the Christian practices that our Founding
Fathers revered.258 Allegheny recognized that although the Court had
previously characterized the references to God in the Pledge as not an
endorsement of religion, "history cannot [legitimize] practices that
demonstrate the government's allegiance to a particular sect or creed." 259
Furthermore, Allegheny recognized that in Marsh v. Chambers,260 the
Court did not support the opinion that "all accepted practices 200 years
old and their equivalents are constitutional today. '261 Even in 1997, the
Court already recognized that although the government has endorsed
Christianity in the past, dating back to our Founding Fathers, "this heri-
tage of official discrimination against non-Christians has no place in the
jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause. '262
Some scholars have erroneously argued that the words "under God" in
the Texas pledge of allegiance are constitutional. Many of these argu-
ments are based on Supreme Court dicta concerning cases that in fact do
not have similar fact patterns to Elk Grove or Croft.2 6 3 This line of rea-
soning is erroneous because it is an attempt to apply the analysis to an
issue with which it does not fit. Although the nation has witnessed many
breaches of the Establishment Clause, the Court itself has recognized that
"they cannot diminish in any way the force of the command [of the Es-
tablishment Clause]. ' 264 Elk Grove is the closest that the Court has come
to directly addressing the constitutionality of the words "under God" in
the Pledge of Allegiance because that was the exact matter before the
Court.265 The Croft court should have followed the analysis in Elk
Grove.
In Newdow, the Ninth Circuit stated that the addition of "under God"
to the Pledge is a profession of a religious belief and that to recite it is to
"swear allegiance to the values for which the flag stands: unity, indivisibil-
ity, justice-and since 1954-monotheism. '266  Representative Lon
256. Id. (citing AUSTIN, supra note 255).
257. See Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 168 (5th Cir. 2010).
258. Id. at 169.
259. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989).
260. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 (1983).
261. Cnry. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603 (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793).
262. Id. at 604-05.
263. See, e.g., Wheeler, supra note 26.
264. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 605.
265. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 4 (2004).
266. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 487 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
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Burnam recognized that the new Texas pledge of 2007 would raise viable
constitutional issues.267 He tried to amend the 2007 bill to include a pro-
vision directing schools to "(1) ensure that students are not coerced to
participate in the recitation of the pledge of allegiance.., and (2) require
a sign to be posted in each classroom near the state flag that states a
student may not be coerced to participate in the recitation of the pledge
of allegiance. '2 68 Ultimately, his proposed amendment did not gain
enough support.2 69 During the discussions in the House of Representa-
tives over the new Texas pledge, Representative Burnam posed tough
questions to the House of Representatives challenging the bill.2 70 He
challenged Representative Riddle, the proponent of the bill, by pointing
out the diverse religions and nonreligions in Texas: "Native American,
Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Baha i', Zoroastrian, Wiccan . . . [and
noted the] 88 Buddhist, 34 Hindu, and 13 Sikh congregations in Texas. 271
When posed with the fairness of putting "under God" in the Texas pledge
in light of this diversity, Representative Riddle's response that the bill's
purpose is to reflect the national pledge seems weak.
Along with arguing that the purpose of the Texas pledge "is to simply
... reflect our national pledge,"2 72 the government also proposes that the
Texas pledge aims to honor how the national pledge reflected the Chris-
tian heritage of our Founding Fathers.2 73 This argument is flawed be-
cause, as mentioned previously, the Court recognized that "this heritage
of official discrimination against non-Christians has no place in the juris-
prudence of the Establishment Clause. '274 Furthermore, times have
greatly changed since the Founding Fathers based the national pledge on
their Christian heritage. That is not to say that the Christian population
has diminished in the United States; in fact, it is the most widespread
religion in the nation.275 Times have changed, however, because one
must now take into account the large groups of immigrants who came to
the United States. These immigrants came in search of the religious free-
dom, among other rights, which they believed America could offer.276
Although some of these immigrants were Christian, most of the immi-
grants were from diverse cultures and religions.2 77 Although the Texas
government may attempt to argue that they are mirroring the national






273. Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 162 (5th Cir. 2010).
274. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 604-05 (1989).
275. Nancy Foner & Richard Alba, Immigrant Religion in the U.S. and Western Europe:
Bridge or Barrier to Inclusion?, 42 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 360, 374 (2008).
276. Alona E. Evans, Political Refugees and the United States Immigration Laws: A
Case Note, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 921, 921 (1968).
277. Fenggang Yang & Helen Rose Ebaugh, Religion and Ethnicity Among New Immi-
grants: The Impact of Majority/Minority Status in Home and Host Countries, 40 J. FOR THE
SC. STUDY OF RELIGIONS 367, 367 (2001).
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pledge, this argument cannot be viable because of the circumstances sur-
rounding the foundation of the national pledge in 1892 versus the Texas
pledge in 2007. As established, the 1892 pledge did not take into account
the diverse citizenship that now embodies the United States. In 2007, the
Texas government could not have claimed that it was motivated by the
same motivations of the 1892 government because the circumstances
were not the same.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the analysis of the Establishment Clause tests, the Supreme
Court should reverse the Croft decision. Croft gives the Supreme Court
another chance to step in where it left off in Elk Grove. A clear Supreme
Court holding regarding religious references in the Texas pledge of alle-
giance will set a solid precedent in the event that the other states with
similar religious references in their pledges encounter the same issue.278
This decision would save courts from trying to balance each case through
a long analysis of each Establishment Clause test. If the Supreme Court
decides to strike down religious references in the state pledges, the state
legislatures will be able to remedy the pledges accordingly. Furthermore,
in ruling on the Texas state pledge, the Supreme Court can use its analysis
as dicta toward future challenges against the national pledge. This analy-
sis is not only applicable to the Pledge of Allegiance, but can also be used
as an example toward various church-and-state related activities that
have not yet been addressed. Most importantly, if the Court can clarify
or redefine the various Establishment Clause tests, the Court can finally
clear the "[m]urky [w]aters of Establishment Clause [j]urisprudence. ' '279
278. See discussion infra Part I.
279. Toy, supra note 18, at 40.
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